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I 
First, a summary of anti-naturalist criticism of explana-
tionism, taking Th. Nagel’s work (1997) as typical. A com-
mon assumption in the debate is the following one: if there 
is a causal explanation of our intuitions, it will appeal to the 
design of our mind, and ultimately to the causal-historical 
forces shaping it. In other words, the thinkers find their 
intuitions immediately compelling because they, the intui-
tions, reflect the built-up of thinker’s minds. The intuition-
contents, on the other hand, tend to be true, since the 
built-up of the mind reflects the most general structures of 
reality that has been causally shaping it. Most expla-
nationists offer the design account as the best available 
explanation-sketch. The anti-explanationists, from Kant 
(Critique of Pure reason, B 176) through Wittgensteinians 
(e.g., J: Lear) to Th. Nagel (1997), G. Bealer (1987) and J. 
Pust (2001), perform a modus tollens on this design-
focused account. Since it is self-undermining and has un-
acceptable normative conesquences it should be rejected, 
they claim. Here is Nagel’s recent formulation of the use of 
evolutionary hypothesis about the origin of our mind-
design: 
But is the hypothesis really compatible with continued con-
fidence in reason as a source of knowledge about the 
nonapparent character of the world? In itself, I believe an 
evolutionary story tells against such confidence. Without 
something more, the idea that our rational capacity was 
the product of natural selection would render reasoning far 
less trustworthy than Nozick suggests, beyond its original 
"coping" functions There would be no reason to trust its 
results in mathematic and science, for example. (And 
insofar as the evolutionary hypothesis itself depends on 
reason, it would be self-undermining.)13 
Unless it is coupled with an independent basis for 
confidence in reason, the evolutionary hypothesis is 
threatening rather than reassuring. It is consistent with 
continued confidence only if it amounts to the hypothesis 
that evolution has led to the existence of creatures, namely 
us, with a capacity for reasoning in whose validity we can 
have much stronger confidence than would be warranted 
merely from its having come into existence in that way. I 
have to be able to believe that the evolutionary explanation 
is consistent with the proposition that I follow the rules of 
logic because they are correct – not merely because I am 
biologically programmed to do so…And one cannot be 
outside them (of argumentative thoughts, NM) and inside 
them at the same time. (T. Nagel, 1997, 135-136 .) 
Nagel goes on to blame every “radically contingent” ac-
count of having such disastrous consequences. The gene-
ral format of anti-explanationist criticism is the following:  
1. We have intuitional or reason based knowledge R. 
2. Features like rational certainty, justifiedness and ratio-
nally binding character are essential (descriptively and 
normatively) for R. 
3. Causal explanation shows that R does not and cannot 
have these features,  
therefore, 
4. Causal explanation both descriptively and normatively 
undermines R. 
5. R is crucial for causal explanation C (it uses mathe-
matics and logic). 
6. Causal explanation C undermines itself (by 3, i.e. 
since it undermines R, which it itself uses). 
The crucial premises are 2. and 3. I intend to question the 
incompatibilist premise 3. Since it claims that causal 
explanation is incompatible with and undermines rational 
justifiedness, it leads directly to the issue of the right 
justificational structure to be used in assessing its truth.  
II 
Fortunately, in this particular issue the common ground is 
suggested by the format of the question itself: are thinkers 
justified in trusting their otherwise compelling intuitions? 
This in turn suggest a distinction of levels: place upon the 
first level the source of beliefs in question, e.g. intuition. 
Place upon a second, meta-cognitive level thinker’s 
reflective awareness about the quality of her first-level 
source, e.g. one’s reflective questioning of or trust in one’s 
intuitions. Thinkers, including ourselves, spontaneously 
find their intuitions true in very compelling manner, and 
therefore, on a reflexive level, consider their intuition-
capacity and their reason generally de facto reliable. This 
reliability of first-order source, if available, yields an 
external, 3rd person justifiedness. In contrast, the reflexive 
or meta-cognitive, second-order trust in one’s own 
reliability, if justified, would make us, the thinkers, 
reflectively justified on the second level. As reflective 
creatures aiming at truth, we need both levels of justifica-
tion. Such a two-level view of justification has been 
probably implicit in classical epistemology (Plato, Des-
cartes, and Spinoza), and is nowadays proposed by 
various authors, most prominently E. Sosa (1991), but also 
K. Lehrer, W. Alston and J. van Cleve (with a lot of 
difference of detail). It can therefore serve as a suitable 
common ground between the explanationist and the anti-
explanationist (the naturalist-explanationist will do well to 
present the epistemic rules as goal-based, grounded in the 
naturalistically acceptable truth-goal). I shall follow the 
most generous variant (of the kind favored by Sosa and 
Lehrer): the thinker may on the second level of reflexive 
questioning use all the available sources in order to 
assess the reliability (and other virtues) of a given first-
order source, in this case of intuition or reason. 
Within such a picture one can distinguish degrees of 
reflective, meta-cognitive achievement on the second, 
reflective level. The lowest degree is guaranteed by the 
immediate compellingness of contents, i.e. of intuitional 
propositions. If the thinker psychologically cannot doubt 
some such proposition, then she is prima facie allowed to 
believe it: epistemic ought implies epistemic can. Still, a 
more conscientious thinker would want to have a coherent 
meta-cognitive perspective on deliverances of her 
cognitive abilities, and an explanatory view on functioning 
of abilities. Again, we may distinguish immediate or folk 
view (of e.g. perception or intuition ability) from theoretical 
perspective on these abilities. 
This suggests a line of response to Nagel’s worries 
about rational certainty. They allege that if one accepted 
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harmony pre-established by evolution, one would have to 
believe logic and mathematics on grounds of evolutionary 
biology. The naturalist need not and should not pursue the 
silly line that we should believe truths of elementary 
arithmetic on the strenght of believing evolutionary theory. 
In case of naturalism this would indeed lead to additional 
implausibility, summarized by the incompatibilist in premise 
(5) above: in order to do evolutionary biology one needs to 
rely upon logic and mathematics, but in order rationally to 
rely upon mathematics, one has to believe truths of evo-
lutionary biology. And this is manifestly absurd. So, one 
should be careful to establish the proper order of jus-
tification on the second, reflective or meta-cognitive level. 
First, psychological obviousness and indubitability gives 
the thinker a prima facie reason for accepting one’s 
intuitions. No naturalist should deny this, since for a 
naturalist normative permissibility should follow from 
descriptive compellingness.  
In the next step the thinker tries to achieve a general 
coherent view of her cognitive abilities and their outputs. It 
is the interplay of (the deliverances of) all capacities, plus 
the best explanation of the whole, that indicates whether a 
particular capacity, in this case intuition is reliable. Merely 
negative coherence with explanation is sufficient: in other 
words, if the explanation does not seriously contradict the 
explanandum (and we have argued that it does not), we 
have good reasons to trust our intuitions. 
The explanation-based doubts about intuition, for 
example, make it vivid for her that the immediate compel-
lingness of an intuition need not be sufficient. But then, the 
indispensability and success come in. Our intuitions 
cohere with our empirical hypotheses, and enable these 
hypotheses to be tested and confirmed. Indispensability 
and success are thus capable of almost completely 
justifying the reliance on intuitional knowledge. They come 
in very handy since they point to the massive empirical 
success of everyday knowledge and of science in which 
such beliefs are essentially used. The success does a 
posteriori vindicate the certainty of elementary logical and 
mathematical intuitions, for which there is a massive 
overlap with factual domain.  
This already shows that in the proper order of justifica-
tion a reliance on evolution for warrant is subsidiary to and 
parasitic upon the simpler but more powerful reasons to 
trust intuitions , i.e. their compelling character and their 
success. We can say more. There is a reasonable 
philosophical worry that some flaw in the origin of our 
intuitions might annihilate their justification. What if they 
come from a demon, Descartes asked. What if they are 
just figments of our imagination? How can information 
coming from within have any “validity” for a mind-inde-
pendent world, Kant asked (and opted for an anti-realist 
solution). It is here that the evolutionary explanation comes 
in. Its role is remedial, i.e. to alleviate or to forestall the 
subtle, purely philosophical skepticism focusing upon a 
distantly and merely possible flaw in the causal ancestry of 
our intuitions. It thus removes the lingering perplexity 
about the mystery of scientific applicability and success of 
our logical and mathematical intuitions.  
III 
Let me address a residual problem. The anti-explanationist 
might claim that evolution of correct logical abilities is not 
only contingent (like evolution of any ability, and of 
mankind as a whole), but very improbable. A breed of 
people might have evolved, very much like us, but with a 
completely deviant logic, trusting it with the same 
compellingness we trust our logic. And might we not 
actually be this breed?  
Here is, in brief, a way for the moderate naturalist 
explanationist to avert the charge. Assume that minimal 
practical rationality brings practical advantages. Then, 
argue that logic is universal, i.e. minimal rationality very 
probably involves practical understanding of logical 
constants. How do you aggregate your thoughts without 
conjunction, how do you infer without implication, and how 
do you think of incompatibilities without negation? The line 
is neutral between naturalism (for instance, and famously 
Quine) and anti-naturalism (see, for instance the recent 
paper by S. Evnine (2001) who points out the importance 
of aggregation and incompatibility. So, Being minimally 
rational very probably involves being minimally logical. 
Therefore, any process that results in there being 
minimally rational creatures, also very probably results in 
there being minimally logical creatures. And, if evolution 
produces rational creatures, then it very probably produces 
minimally logical creatures. Given evolutionary naturalism, 
minimal logical capacities are to be expected.  
Notice that high conditional probability of logic given 
rationality is enough. Nobody would seriously question 
causal explanation on the ground that the emergence of 
life itself is relatively improbable, or that evolution of 
nervous system is antecedently quite improbable. The 
challenge is more geared to the alleged possibilities of 
evolution of intelligent creatures similar to ourselves, but 
devoid of logical rules. So, although the evolution of 
rational creatures might in itself “radically contingent” 
(extremely improbable), the fact that once rational 
creatures are on their way, minimally logical creatures are 
on their way is not radically contingent. We have no 
reason to doubt our own rational capacities and basic 
logical intuitions on the grounds of evolutionary theory. 
Evolutionary theory does not undermine itself. 
The critic might claim, like, for instance, Evnine (2001) 
that universality of logic is itself provable on a priori 
grounds, against the claim of naturalists. The answer is 
that universality of logic is the best explanatory hypothesis 
available. Witness the connectionism debate, in particular 
Smolensky vs. Fodor&Pylyshyn debate. E.g. We simply 
know of no other way, and this is enough for the present 
argument.  
Returning to the normative issues, the naturalist can 
accept that logic is basic in the way of justification, i.e. that 
a thinker is prima facie justified in following logical rules 
simple in virtue of their basicness and compellingness. 
This is the common ground of naturalists and anti-
naturalists, briefly visited in section II. Such justificatory 
basicness is neutral, i.e. compatible with ultimate apriorism 
and ultimate aposteriorism (e.g. with logical intuitions being 
ultimately, but not prima facie justified by our total theory). 
The naturalist will add justification by empirical success, 
thus enhancing and not diminishing the justifiedness of our 
basic intuitional beliefs.  
Let me recap. I have been arguing, although in very 
sketchy and programmatic manner, that explanationism is 
compatible with justification of intuition- and reason-based 
beliefs. Using the model of two-stage justification, 
acceptable for both parties, one can insure sufficient 
justifiedness of such beliefs, without having to shun 
broadly causal explanations of their reliability. And if you 
can explain your intuitions, you have more reason to trust 
them. Surprisingly, the explanationist can thus do more 
justice to the reasonableness of our trust in intuitions, than 
her opponent, who relegates them to the realm of 
unexplainable mystery.  
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